Taylor rule estimation with the presence of a ZLB-period : how the inclusion of shadow rate affect the precision of Taylor rule estimation on the federal funds rate. by Anda, Simen Andreas & Carron, Matthieu Kjerland
Norwegian School of Economics
Bergen, Fall 2019
Taylor Rule Estimation with the
Presence of a ZLB-Period
How the inclusion of shadow rate aﬀect the precision of Taylor rule
estimation on the federal funds rate.
Simen Andreas Anda & Matthieu Kjerland Carron
Supervisor: Gernot Peter Doppelhofer
Master thesis, Economics and Business Administration
Major: Finance
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business
Administration at NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are
responsible – through the approval of this thesis – for the theories and methods used, or
results and conclusions drawn in this work.

iAcknowledgements
This master thesis was written during the fall of 2019 as a part of our Master of Science
degree in Economics and Business Administration at NHH Norwegian School of Economics.
We would like to thank our supervisor, professor Gernot Peter Doppelhofer, for great
guidance throughout this process. He has been of much help in selecting the scope of
our thesis and reaching our findings. Furthermore, we wish to thank our co-students for
knowledgeable and social development through our years at NHH.
Norwegian School of Economics
Bergen, December 2019
Simen Andreas Anda Matthieu Kjerland Carron
ii
Abstract
This thesis estimates monetary policy reaction functions for the United States’ economy
from 1987 until 2015 using a Taylor rule. The period 2009-2015 was characterized by
the federal funds rate being bounded below by zero, commonly known as the zero lower
bound (ZLB). To measure the eﬀect of monetary policy during this period, a shadow rate
was proposed. A shadow rate is an estimated, theoretical interest rate not bounded by
the ZLB. We compare estimations of the Taylor rule on out-of-sample data using both
the federal funds rate bounded below by zero and the federal funds rate with a shadow
rate. We find that the Taylor rule estimations conducted with the shadow rate fits closer
to the out-of-sample eﬀective federal funds rate, than standard estimations that includes
the data bounded below by zero. Our thesis suggests that shadow rate can be used as a
tool to analyze monetary policy in a Taylor rule setting, using data with the presence of a
ZLB-period. Furthermore, our results suggests that there is value in including shadow
rate in macroeconomic models for monetary policy.
Keywords – Taylor rule, shadow rate, zero lower bound, monetary policy
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11 Introduction
Monetary policy is critical for a well-balanced and well-functioning economy. The Federal
Reserve is the United States’ monetary policy authority. Their goal is to maximize
sustainable output and employment, while managing stable prices through low and stable
inflation. It cannot control inflation, output or employment directly, but aﬀects these
indirectly, mainly through adjusting the federal funds rate. From December 2008, until
December 2015, the eﬀective federal funds rate was in the 0 to 0.25 percent range. During
this time the Federal Reserve could not lower the rate further to provide more economic
stimulus, as it had oﬃcially entered a zero lower bound. The zero lower bound (ZLB), is
the condition in which the interest rate cannot become negative. However, some central
banks (e.g European Central Bank, Sweden’s Riksbank and the Bank of Japan) have at
some point adopted negative short-term interest rates. A negative interest rate could lead
to market participants hoarding cash, as it becomes an arbitrage opportunity (Altavilla
et al., 2019). Hence, in this thesis we will treat zero as a strict lower limit for the eﬀective
federal funds rate. In the presence of a ZLB regime, the eﬀects of monetary policies will
not be visible by the change in the interest rate. To measure such eﬀects, Wu and Xia
(2016) proposed an estimated interest rate named the shadow rate. The shadow rate (SR)
can be defined as an implied, negative rate capable of measuring the eﬀects of monetary
policies in the case of a ZLB regime. Given the likelihood of entering such a regime later
on, the rate can be useful in macroeconomic models that utilize the federal funds rate, for
example the Taylor rule.
John Taylor introduced what later became known as the Taylor rule in 1993 to illustrate
how the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy. The Taylor rule suggested that the
interest rate should be set to minimize the diﬀerence between inflation and the inflation
target, and real output and potential output (Taylor, 1993). Following the introduction
in 1993, several additions have been made to the literature, a prominent contribution was
made by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998). They presented an updated policy rule, using
a forward-looking model named the baseline model, which will be the initial basis for our
analyses.
In this thesis we want to answer the research questions of whether employing the shadow
2rate in Taylor rule estimation produces superior out-of-sample results, compared to using
data containing measurements bounded below by zero. We will confirm through relevant
literature if it is possible to estimate a Taylor rule using measures of the shadow rate as a
substitute for the federal funds rate when the ZLB is binding. Our estimated Taylor rules
will be based on an in-sample period of 111 observations, extending from 1988Q2 until
2015Q4.
Our findings presented in this thesis confirms that employing a shadow rate in a Taylor
rule estimation yields superior out-of-sample performance. We have verified our results,
both in terms of RMSE and MAE, by comparing our two estimated models (with and
without shadow rate) to out-of-sample federal funds rate data, from 2016Q1 to 2019Q3.
The out-of-sample period is the latest available data without the presence of a ZLB.
Relevant literature also confirms that the shadow rate can be used in macroeconomic
models as a substitute for the federal funds rate (e.g. Bullard et al. (2012) and Krippner
(2012, 2013)). Hence, we find it reasonable that it can be used as a substitute in a Taylor
rule estimation as well.
Answering our research question may prove valuable for several reasons. Firstly, entering
a ZLB regime in the future is increasingly likely, making the use of a shadow rate
advantageous in a Taylor rule interpretation of a normalized federal funds rate. Secondly,
advocating the performance of the shadow rate implies that further use of the shadow
rate, or alternative estimates of a negative interest rate, can improve other macroeconomic
models.
32 Background
In this section, we will first introduce the Federal Reserve and their primary objectives,
which tools they have at their disposal to reach these objectives, before we consider their
use of the Taylor rule. Lastly we will present the necessary context of zero lower bound
and shadow rate.
2.1 The Federal Reserve and its mandate
Functioning as the central bank of the United States, the Federal Reserve has four main
objectives. These are to (1) conduct monetary policy, (2) provide emergency liquidity,
(3) to supervise certain banks and financial firms to secure safety and soundness, and
lastly, (4) to operate key payment system services for the government and financial
firms (Labonte and Makinen, 2019). These responsibilities are delegated by the Congress
through the Federal Reserve Act with the intention of ensuring or maintaining “maximum
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates” (Labonte and Makinen,
2019). The necessary tasks that supports this statutory mandate is divided between three
core entities within the Federal Reserve system (Labonte, 2019). First, it is the Board of
Governors who are in charge of overseeing the operations of the regional federal banks,
as well as directing and guiding the reserve banks when they are conducting financial
services to depository institutions or the government (Board of Governors’ Publications
Committee, 2016). Second, there is twelve regional Reserve banks responsible for carrying
out the main objectives of the Federal Reserve within its region/district. This implies
that the regional banks are responsible for supervising and examining both financial and
non-financial institutions, lending to depository institutions, providing and maintaining
key financial services as the distributor of the nation’s currency, clearing checks, serving
as a bank for the U.S. Treasury, and finally, to examine certain financial institutions
to ensure compliance with federal consumer protection (Ryan et al., 2009). Lastly, the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC ) is the decision making entity of the Federal
Reserve system in regards to monetary policy. They meet every six weeks, in addition
to unscheduled meetings, to announce their stance regarding monetary policy (Labonte,
2019). In 2012 the FOMC was responsible for adopting the 2% inflation target which is
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the Federal Reserve’s interpretation of "stable prices" as of their mandate (Lavigne et al.,
2012).
2.2 Policy tools
To carry out monetary policy the Federal Reserve targets the federal funds rate. The
FOMC determines the federal funds target rate, while the lending and borrowing between
depository institutions reflects the market equilibrium of the same rate, constituting the
eﬀective federal funds rate. There is several ways for the Federal Reserve to keep the
federal funds rate close to its target. By imposing a reserve requirement held at the federal
bank for every depository institution, the Federal Reserve creates a stable demand for
reserves. Traditionally, they have used a method of open market operations to adjust
the supply of reserves. This method implies selling or buying U.S Treasury notes in the
secondhand market. Doing so alters the money supply and credit conditions, which in turn
aﬀects the interest rate that depository institutions charge each other for overnight loans
(i.e. the eﬀective federal funds rate) in order to meet the reserve requirement. In addition
to open market operations, the Federal Reserve can initiate discount window lending.
This implies that the depository institutions borrows directly from the Federal Reserve
Bank at a rate determined by the Board of Governors, rather than from other depository
institutions. The rate of the discount window have been placed above the federal funds
rate since 2003, implying that depository institutions only utilized the discount window
when the market behaved in a manner that pushed the eﬀective federal funds rate above
the discount window rate. (Board of Governors’ Publications Committee, 2016)
Recessions can alter the way a central bank conducts its monetary policy. At the start of
the financial crisis the Federal Reserve increased its lending through the discount window
and initiated several programs stated in the Federal Reserve Act to help stabilize the
shortage of liquidity in the market. In addition, the FOMC also cut the federal funds
target rate from 5.25% to about 0% between 2007 and the end of 2008. Although this
response somewhat stabilized the financial markets to a degree that it could function
normally, the impact of the financial crisis was so severe and long-lasting that these actions
where not suﬃcient. Given that the federal funds rate was closing in on its zero lower
bound, the Federal Reserve could not utilize the federal funds rate to support the economy.
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Instead, the FOMC chose to use two diﬀerent kinds of monetary policy, namely large-scale
asset purchases (i.e. quantitative easing) and forward guidance. (Board of Governors’
Publications Committee, 2016)
Large-scale asset purchase, often termed as quantitative easing (QE ), is a monetary policy
tool that the Federal Reserve used during the end of 2008 when they purchased large
amounts of long-term securities to put a downward pressure on the long-term interest
rate (Board of Governors’ Publications Committee, 2016). This is done to move investors
and financial institutions away from investing in long-term securities and over to real
investments that drive employment and growth. During the financial crisis the Federal
Reserve bought U.S Treasury notes, agency debt and agency mortgage backed securities
for a total of $2.5 trillion (Labonte and Makinen, 2019). When the federal funds rate
hit zero in late 2008, the Federal Reserve initiated forward guidance. This implies that
the FOMC informs the public of its future intention for the federal funds rate in its post
meeting statements to aﬀect expectations. (Board of Governors’ Publications Committee,
2016)
In 2015 the FOMC increased the federal funds target rate to 0.25%, its first change since
December 2008. This also marked the start of normalising their stance of monetary policy,
as the employment was consistent with what can be seen as "maximum employment"
(Board of Governors’ Publications Committee, 2016). Normalisation in this case implies
rising short-term interest rates to more normal levels and also decreasing the size of the
Federal Reserve balance sheet. As of 2019 the Federal Reserve is well underway towards
normalisation as the federal funds target rate has hit 1.25% and the balance sheet is
steadily shrinking as securities reach maturity.
2.3 The Federal Reserve and the Taylor rule
When deciding upon the direction of the monetary policy the FOMC "regularly consults the
policy prescriptions from several monetary policy rules along with other information that
is relevant to the economy and the economic outlook". (Board of Governors’ Publications
Committee, 2018b)
Following existing literature published by the Federal Reserve (e.g Knotek II et al. (2016),
Kliesen (2019)) the Taylor rule, first proposed by Taylor (1993), is acknowledged as a
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benchmark for assessing the stance on monetary policy. The Taylor rule states that
the monetary authority, in our case the Federal Reserve, should set its policy rate in
accordance with the change in inflation and the output gap. In critique to such policy
rules, one can argue that the simple policy prescriptions do not take into account the
many complexities of the real economy (Board of Governors’ Publications Committee,
2018a). However, models like the Taylor rule should simply serve as a guidance when
deciding on monetary policy (Taylor, 1993).
2.4 Zero lower bound and shadow rate
As mentioned above, the FOMC lowered the federal funds target rate to approximately
zero between 2007 and December 2008. Thus, reaching its zero lower bound. Since
currency is available as an alternative asset, negative nominal interest rates would lead
to riskless arbitrage opportunities, thus rates are bounded below by zero (Bauer and
Rudebusch, 2016). The ZLB aﬀects not only the way the central bank conducts its
monetary policy, but as pointed out by Lindé et al. (2017), it also aﬀects the behaviour of
economic models.
To explain the eﬀects of monetary policy with the federal funds rate at the lower bound
some research has focused on the ZLB sub-period (Wu and Xia, 2016). This approach
leads to the exclusion of six years of valuable macroeconomic data. Furthermore, it poses
an issue in summarizing monetary policy after the economy exits the ZLB. The shadow
rate is a possible solution to aid economists in analyzing monetary policy with the presence
of a ZLB-period.
An initial model for implied interest rates was created by Black (1995), namely the
shadow rate term structure model (SRTSM ). Wu and Xia (2016) used the shadow rate
from the SRTSM to construct a new measure for the monetary policy stance when the
eﬀective federal funds rate is bounded below by zero, and employed this measure to study
unconventional monetary policy’s (e.g. QE) impact on the real economy. The shadow rate
term structure model is able to capture a scenario of the yield curve going into negative
territory, rather than being restrained to a zero lower bound, like other term structure
models (Lemke and Vladu, 2015). We explain how the shadow rate is estimated in section
4.1.2 and appendix A2.
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Wu and Xia (2016) approached the question of shadow rate validity using a formal
hypothesis test, which tested whether the parameters related to the shadow rate were
diﬀerent from the parameters related to the federal funds rate. They used a 3-factors
Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) model to study the eﬀects of monetary
policy interventions. The method allowed them to summarize information from a large set
of economic variables. From the analysis, Wu and Xia found that the shadow rate showed
similar dynamic correlations with macroeconomic variables during the ZLB-period, as the
federal funds rate did prior to the financial crisis. Hereby confirming the validity of using
the shadow rate in place of the federal funds rate. The results substantiated the findings
of Bullard et al. (2012) and Krippner (2012), who advocated the value of shadow rate to
describe monetary policy stance.
Given the fact that the federal funds target rate is well underway to more normal short-
term levels we find it highly interesting to study the possible insights that the shadow rate
may provide on out-of-sample performance. More explicitly, we will study the implications
of shadow rate versus the actual eﬀective federal funds rate in estimating a Taylor rule for
the U.S economy with a ZLB regime.
83 Taylor rule
In the following section, we will present the original Taylor rule along with a version
that can be characterized as forward-looking, and lastly, a smoothed version of the
forward-looking policy rule.
3.1 The original Taylor rule
The original Taylor rule was proposed by Taylor (1993) as a simple policy rule that could
eﬀectively "call for changes in the federal funds rate in response to changes in the price
level or changes in real income". This resulted in the following equation:
r = ⇡¯ + 0.5y + 0.5(⇡¯   ⇡¯⇤) + 2 (3.1)
where r is the federal funds rate, ⇡¯ is the rate of inflation over the previous four quarters
and y is the percent deviation of real GDP from a target. Taylor chose to set the inflation
target (⇡¯*) at two percent, which as mentioned in section 2.1, the FOMC also did in 2012.
This yields the original version that Taylor proposed:
r = ⇡¯ + 0.5y + 0.5(⇡¯   2) + 2 (3.2)
This can be simplified to the following equation:
r = 1 + 1.5⇡¯ + 0.5y (3.3)
Equation 3.3 implies that the "equilibrium" nominal rate is four percent when the inflation
is at its target of two percent and the real GDP is equal to potential GDP, giving an
output gap (y) of zero. Further, Taylor (1993) states that his policy rule "cannot and
should not be mechanically followed by policymakers", but rather function as an indicator
for what needs to be done. Following this, the "Taylor principle" provides clarification.
It states that a one percentage change in inflation should lead to a greater than one
percentage change in the nominal interest rate. The reason for this is to make sure that
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the rise in real interest rate is above the rise in inflation, so that the interest rate do not
accommodate for any shocks that initially caused the rise in inflation (Woodford, 2001).
Taylor (1993) found the original policy rule to fit quite well to the federal funds rate
between 1987 and 1992, with respect to its simplicity. However, there have been countless
attempts to estimate diﬀerent versions of the Taylor rule since the paper of John Taylor
was released.
3.2 Forward-looking Taylor rule
The original Taylor rule proposed by Taylor (1993) is a backward-looking model. This
entails that, for instance, the FOMC sets the federal funds target rate r for period t based
on both the inflation and output gap for the period t-n until time t. Researchers point
out that the Federal Reserve also look at expected inflation when they are to decide the
federal funds target rate (Clarida et al., 2000, 1998). Hence, we have been inspired by the
work of Clarida et al. (1998) and Clarida et al. (2000) which estimate a Taylor rule using
data for expected inflation and output gap, categorizing it as a forward-looking model.
Formally, the model is a hybrid with both expected values and lagged values of variables
as they use a lagged interest rate as a regressor.
3.2.1 Interest rate target
A forward-looking Taylor rule with an interest rate target, e.g. the model by Clarida et al.
(2000), assumes that the central bank chooses a target for the nominal interest rate that
they wish to reach in a given period. Hence, the target rate in period t is
i⇤t = i
⇤ +  (E[⇡t,k|⌦t]  ⇡⇤) +  [xt,q|⌦t] (3.4)
where i* is the "equilibrium" nominal interest rate, as mentioned above, the nominal
interest rate when both inflation and output gap is equal to their targets. ⇡t,k is the
quarterly expected inflation between period t and period t+k. xt,q is the quarterly output
gap between period t and period t+q in the forward-looking model. However, in our
version we will use expected four quarters ahead data for inflation, substituting the
t+k term with t+4. In addition, we will use current data for the output gap, therefore
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substituting the t+k term with t. The output variable is nonetheless still presented as an
expected variable, given that the potential GDP is a long-term estimated value. Further,
  and   are the coeﬃcients of expected inflation and the output gap, respectively, while
⇡⇤ is the inflation target rate. The model can be simplified by introducing a constant
term ↵ = i* +  ⇡⇤. This yields the following equation
i⇤t = ↵ +  E[⇡t+4|⌦t] +  E[xt|⌦t] (3.5)
  and   determines the responsiveness of policy to the change in expected inflation and
output gap, respectively. ⌦ is the information set at time t, which is further discussed in
section 5.3.
3.2.2 Interest rate smoothing
The output of the above model displays the target rate as the interest rate the central
bank pursues to close the deviations from its inflation and output targets. However, the
model does not consider the fact that central banks tend to smooth interest rates. There
are various reasons for the central bank to do this. Goodfriend (1991) states that the
federal reserve smooth interest rates to cushion the banking system against interest rate
shocks. He also says that the Federal Reserve dislike changing the interest rate in diﬀerent
directions close to each other, called "whipsawing the market".
By adding interest smoothing into equation 3.5 we can create an expression for the actual
nominal interest rate. This implies that the central bank will choose the weight between
i*, the target interest rate, and ⇢, the smoothing of the interest rate. Equation 3.6 displays
this relationship as
it = (1  ⇢)i⇤t + ⇢it 1 + v1t (3.6)
where ⇢ is the smoothing coeﬃcient and v1t is an exogenous interest rate shock term with
a zero mean. Fully introducing equation 3.5 into equation 3.6 will yield a Taylor rule for
the actual nominal interest rate, presented as
3.2 Forward-looking Taylor rule 11
it = (1  ⇢)(↵ +  E[⇡t+4] +  E[xt]) + ⇢it 1 + v1t (3.7)
The model of equation 3.7 is no longer linear in its parameters, and clearly displays the
eﬀects of interest rate smoothing. For example, if you have a smoothing parameter ⇢ of
0.85, then the interest rate target of equation 3.5 is only approached by 15% of what
it would have been if there was no smoothing present. Further, given an output gap of
zero and a   of 1, a positive 1% inflation shock would imply that the central bank only
adjusted the interest rate up by 0.15%. By using a lagged dependent variable we soak up
serial correlation, implying that we do not test our model for serial correlation.
3.2.3 Our chosen model
Inspired by the work of Clarida et al. (1998) and Clarida et al. (2000), our interpretation of
a forward-looking Taylor rule is displayed below. The model will be derived with regards
to GMM in section 5.3.
it = (1  ⇢)(↵ +  E[⇡t+4] +  E[xt]) + ⇢it 1 + v1t (3.8)
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4 Data
The following section presents the data used in our analysis. In subsection 4.1 we present
the time series used in our Taylor rule estimation, along with separate figures of each
variable. In subsection 4.2 we present and explain the structural break that supports our
chosen sample period.
4.1 Time series
The variables used for our Taylor rule estimation is presented along with their respective
figures. Our in-sample-period mainly stretches from 1987Q2 until 2015Q4, but as we
conduct a robustness check with a sample ending in 2016Q4, we display the variables
graphically with the period 1987Q2-2016Q4. The federal funds rate is used in the out-of-
sample comparisons and are therefore displayed from 1987Q2 to 2019Q3. Our sources of
data have been the FRED®data service provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis
and the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. The mnemonics shown in parentheses are the
labels used to identify each series by FRED®. The figures presented in this section have
all been created using RStudio and the "ggplot2"-package.
4.1.1 The federal funds rate
As our measure of the short-term nominal interest rate we use the eﬀective federal funds
rate (FEDFUNDS). As mentioned in section 2.2, the rate is calculated as an weighted-
average of the agreed rate for an overnight loan between depository institutions. The
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) determines the federal funds target rate, while
the lending and borrowing between depository institutions reflects the market equilibrium
of the same rate, constituting the eﬀective federal funds rate. The rate applied in
our analysis is calculated as daily averages converted to quarterly averages. Figure 4.1
illustrates the development of the eﬀective federal funds rate.
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Figure 4.1: Eﬀective federal funds rate and shadow rate
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4.1.2 Shadow rate
We chose the estimated rate by Wu and Xia (2016) as our shadow rate throughout our
thesis. The rate is extracted from the Federal Reserve bank of Atlanta. The input data
for the shadow rate are one-month forward rates beginning n years hence. Wu and Xia
use forward rates corresponding to n = 1/4, 1/2, 1, 2, 5, 7, and 10 years. The forward
rates are from estimated Svensson (1995) and Nelson and Siegel (1987) model parameters.
The parameters are obtained by independently fitting observations of coupon-paying yield
curve data from the Gürkaynak et al. (2007) data set. In short, the shadow rate is assumed
to be a linear function of three latent variables called factors, which follow a VAR(1)
process. The latent factors and the shadow rate are estimated with the extended Kalman
filter, by adding it to equation 4.1. The Kalman filter takes a linear approximation for
the yield data, as the factors are non-linear. The forward rate in the SRTSM described in
appendix A2 with equations A.1 - A.5 can be approximated to equation 4.1:
fSRTSMn,n+1,t = r +  
Q
n g
✓
an + b0nXt   r
 Qn
◆
(4.1)
where ( Qn )2 ⌘ VarQt (st+1). The function g(z) consists of a normal cumulative distribution
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function and a normal probability density function. The approximation for the equation
can be found in appendix A2. The computations is derived from the paper of Wu and
Xia. For further insight we refer to "Measuring the macroeconomic impact of monetary
policy at the zero lower bound" by Wu and Xia (2016). Their computed shadow rate is
displayed in figure 4.1. In this thesis we assume that we can treat the estimated shadow
rate like observations. However, this will imply larger standard errors when accounting
for estimation uncertainty, but this is regarded beyond the scope of our thesis.
4.1.3 Expected inflation
For expected inflation we chose the forecasted value of four-quarter PCE inflation
three quarters ahead provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey
of Professional Forecasters. It is a measure of the PCE inflation of the current quarter
together with the median forecast of the subsequent three quarters. Prior to 2007 this
forecast was not collected. To collect a long-term time series for this specific data the
Survey of Professional Forecasters subtracts the consumer price index by 0.3 percentage
points to obtain the pre-2007 values. The choice of PCE inflation is regarded as favorable
in contrast to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (Mehra and Sawhney, 2010). Figure 4.2
displays the expected inflation along with the 2% inflation target. As mentioned in section
2.1 the inflation target was oﬃcially adpoted by the FOMC in 2012. Taylor (1993) also
suggested 2% as a measure of inflation target in his original policy rule. Hence, we use
2% as our inflation target for our entire sample period.
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Figure 4.2: Expected inflation
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4.1.4 The output gap
As our measure of the output gap we use the diﬀerence between real potential gross
domestic product(GDPPOT) and real gross domestic product(GDPC1). The former is
the level of real GDP that is consistent with steady growth and a stable rate of inflation.
Potential GDP is estimated on the basis of fundamental determinants of supply, like
labor, capital and unemployment. The estimates are conducted on a sectorial level
comprising of six sectors being non-farm business, farm, the federal government, state and
local governments, households, and nonprofit institutions (Shackleton, 2018). Both the
measurements of GDP are provided with a quarterly frequency and is reported in chained
2012 dollars. The output gap is illustrated in figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: The output gap
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4.1.5 Instrumental variables
As a solution to endogenous regressors we include instrumental variables. This method
provides a way to obtain consistent parameter estimates. Further, as our thesis is inspired
by the works of Clarida, Gali & Gertler, we apply the instruments included by them,
i.e. commodity price inflation and the long-short spread. To reach a model with all
parameters being significant we decide to extend the information set. When deciding
which instrumental variables to include in our estimation, we tried to approximate the
true information set, hereby obtaining consistent and significant parameters. The financial
markets are known for their eﬃciency of applying all available information, accounting for
both past, present and expected information. Hence, we pursued to include instrumental
variables that communicate data related to financial markets.
We use seven instrumental variables in our extended information set when carrying out our
empirical analysis. We have chosen to include commodity price inflation (PPIACO), the
spread between the 10-year Treasury note and the 3-month Treasury bill (T10Y3M), house
price inflation (CSUSHPINSA), return on average equity for all U.S banks (USROE),
total public debt (GFDEBTN) and the US/UK exchange rate (DEXUSUK). The data
have all been collected from FRED®, as seen from the mnemonics in the parentheses.
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Additionally, we have also chosen to use a measure of unemployment gap as a regressor
when conducting a robustness check. In addition it will be added as an instrumental
variable along with the data mentioned above. The unemployment gap is measured as the
diﬀerence between the actual unemployment rate and the Congressional Budget Oﬃce’s
estimate of the natural rate of unemployment. This natural rate is a nonaccelerating
inflation rate of unemployment, often referred to as NAIRU, which is consistent with
a stable rate of inflation (Arnold, 2001). The data is sourced from the website of the
Atlanta Federal Reserve. The instrumental variables data is presented more thoroughly in
the appendix section A1.
As mentioned we included the variables since we believe they reflect the stance of the
financial markets. The variable that displays the change in housing prices is included due
to its ability to show the expectations of future economic conditions, perfectly aligning
with our forward-looking model. It does so by exhibiting the households expectations for
both their personal economy as well as the entire macro economy, which was proven for
Norwegian data (Anundsen and Jansen, 2013). Further, exchange rate have shown to
alter the expectations of the market agents, again providing the analysis with a useful
expectations term (Kallianiotis, 2016). The US/UK exchange rate is used in favor of the
US/EU exchange rate due to its time of existence. Also, the return on average equity for
all U.S banks can measure diﬀerent risk characteristics important in pricing the market
(He and Ng, 1994). Followingly, it provides relevant information for the stance of the
financial markets and is therefore included in our extended information set. Lastly, the
change in public debt has an eﬀect on real per capita GDP (Kumar and Woo, 2010). This
will in turn indicate that an increase in the public debt will have a negative impact on
the financial markets and vice versa. These instrumental variables have also been used for
Taylor rule estimation on Norwegian data by Skumsnes (2013), serving as an additional
guidance in the choice of instrumental variables. All of the instrumental variables in our
extended model have been diﬀerenced. Furthermore, we tested the variables for seasonality
and found that the data for house price inflation needed to be seasonally diﬀerenced. To
confirm whether our additional instrumental variables supports our model, we compare the
J-stats and parameters of the baseline and extended model in section 6.1. The extended
model yields a higher J-stat and all significant parameters, indicating that the extended
instrument set improves the model. Figure 4.4 - 4.10 displays the instrumental variables,
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including the unemployment gap.
Figure 4.4: Commodity price inflation
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Figure 4.5: House price inflation
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Figure 4.6: Long-short spread
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Figure 4.7: Change in return on equity for U.S banks
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
1990 2000 2010
Time
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 (%
)
Return on average equity Shadow rate FEDFUNDS
20 4.1 Time series
Figure 4.8: Change in total public debt
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Figure 4.9: Change in US/UK foreign exchange rate
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Figure 4.10: Unemployment gap
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4.2 Structural breaks and sample period
Clarida et al. (2000) found significant diﬀerences in their estimated Taylor rules across
diﬀerent chairs of the Federal Reserve, serving as natural choices of structural breaks.
Especially the period served by Paul Volcker has been influential on the U.S economy as
he marked the start of a diﬀerent monetary policy with his work on disinflation. The
later period of Volcker, followed by his successor Alan Greenspan, have been regarded as
a period with focus on fighting inflation (Goodfriend and King, 2005). Empirical evidence
also show that there have been a drop in the persistence of the inflation, dropping the
measurement to significantly lower levels in the Volcker-Greenspan era in contrast to
Arthur Burns and George William Miller’s chairmanships (Beechey and Österholm, 2007;
Clarida et al., 2000). Hence, we find it reasonable to use a sample period from 1987Q2
with quarterly data, as this marks the period when Greenspan was appointed chair of the
Federal Reserve. Belke and Klose (2010) have estimated a Taylor rule for U.S data and
argued that quarterly data do not properly catch the dynamics as well as monthly data.
On the other hand, Islam (2011) estimated both a forward- and backward-looking Taylor
rule using U.S data, finding no evidence that the frequency of the data aﬀects the results.
In addition, as our Taylor rule estimation is inspired by Clarida et al. (2000) who uses
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quarterly data, our analysis will employ the same frequency.
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5 Methodology
The following sections presents the econometric methods we use in analyzing our data.
Firstly, we explain why we have chosen the generalized method of moments (GMM ) for
Taylor rule estimation. Then we discuss how our estimations are performed, and lastly we
present limitations with the econometric framework.
5.1 Econometric approach
From our discussion of the preferable Taylor rule we presented a policy rule using a
smoothing parameter. The original Taylor rule presented by Taylor (1993) does not
include a smoothing parameter, which implies linearity in the parameters. Following the
findings from the presented literature by Clarida et al. (1998) we see that it is determined
that using a smoothing parameter results in more precise estimations. When we apply
a smoothing parameter the parameters are no longer linear. Non-linearity is a violation
of the OLS assumptions of consistent and unbiased estimators. Hence, we must apply
a method that can account for non-linearity. Furthermore, since we are dealing with a
forward-looking model we have to apply a method that is robust to issues with endogeneity.
Since we use an expected value as a regressor - see section 4.1.3 - the explanatory variables
will be correlated with the error term at time t. Thus, in addition to non-linearity, we
have to use a method that accounts for endogeneity.
5.2 GMM
Generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation is one of the most used methods
for estimating models in economics (Hall, 2005). Through the use of instrumental
variables the method handles non-linear estimations with endogenous explanatory
variables. Furthermore, GMM brings the advantage of dealing with heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation in the residuals. The method uses a set of moment conditions to solve for
the parameters of the model. Inspired by Drukker (2010), Monsrud and Mjelde (2018)
formulates the moment conditions as follows.
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E[m(yt, xt, zt, ✓) = 0] (5.1)
m is a q⇤1 vector of functions, where the expected values are zero. The left-hand side
variable is defined by yt and xt is the explanatory variable vector. Additionally, zt is a q⇤1
vector of instrumental variables and ✓ is a k⇤1 vector of parameters, where k  q. The
sample moments from the population moments are:
m¯(✓) =
1
T
⌃Tt=1Tm(yt, xt, zt, ✓) (5.2)
The goal is to solve the over-identified system of moment conditions. When k < q, the
GMM chooses the parameters that minimize the following objective function with respect
to the parameter vector :
✓GMM ⌘ ⌃Tt=1argmin✓m¯(✓)0Wm¯(✓) (5.3)
Only, when k = q can we get an explicit formula where the moment conditions are exactly
satisfied. Then the GMM estimator solves m¯(✓) so that m¯(✓)0Wm¯(✓)=0. When the system
is overidentified, we minimize with the use of numerical optimization methods. This is
because a large number of moment conditions require a numerical minimization.
5.3 GMM and Taylor rule
In this section we will use the Taylor rule presented in section 3.2.2, and show how we
apply the generalized method of moments. Initially, we present equation 3.8.
it = (1  ⇢)(↵ +  E[⇡t+4|⌦] +  E[xt|⌦t]) + ⇢it 1 + v1t
Furthermore, we eliminate the unobserved forecast variables by introducing an auxiliary
variable. (Clarida et al., 1998)
✏1t =  (1  ⇢)( (⇡t+4   E[⇡t+4|⌦t]) +  (xt   E[xt|⌦t])) + v1t (5.4)
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This equation is a combination of the forecast errors and the exogenous error term.
Consequently, it is orthogonal to variables in the information set. Next, we solve the
equation for v1t.
v1t =  (1  ⇢)( (⇡t+4   E[⇡t+4|⌦t]) +  (xt   E[xt|⌦t])) + ✏1t (5.5)
To remove the expectation term we insert 5.5 into 5.3. Resulting in the following equation:
it = (1  ⇢)(↵ +  E[⇡t+4|⌦t] +  E[xt|⌦t]) + ⇢it 1+
(1  ⇢)( (⇡t+4   E[⇡t+4|⌦t]) +  (xt   E[xt|⌦t)) + ✏1t
(5.6)
Lastly, we rewrite the policy rule in terms of realized variables, hereby eliminating the
unobserved forecast variables. The result is the policy reaction function:
it = (1  ⇢)(↵ +  ⇡t+4 +  xt]) + ⇢it 1 + ✏1t (5.7)
To reach the parameter vector for estimation, we use an instrument set zt, which is a
vector of variables within the information set ⌦t. The instrument set can consist of any
lagged and current variables that are uncorrelated with ✏1t, and hereby orthogonal to the
error term. Thus, the condition is E[✏1t|Zt] = 0, which we write as:
E[it   (1  ⇢)[↵ +  ⇡t,k +  xt,q]  ⇢it 1|Zt] = 0 (5.8)
Therefore, what we want to estimate is the parameter vector [⇢,↵,  ,  ]. To perform this
estimation we use GMM. In the inital Taylor rule model we use the instrumental variables
proposed by Clarida et al. (1998). This implies four lags of the regressors, commodity
inflation and long-short spread. Hence, the number of instruments surpasses the number
of parameters in our vector, implying that our model is overidentified. The handling of
overidentification will be presented in the next section.
The Federal Reserve might include other factors when determining the funds rate, which
implies that adding more variables could contribute to a better fitting model. However,
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the goal of our thesis is to compare the inclusion of shadow rate to a standard rule. Thus,
focusing on fitting the most precise model is out of our scope, and we will not present a
model with additional variables beyond the given parameter vector.
5.3.1 Out-of-sample performance
To answer our question of whether the Taylor rule estimated with shadow rate outperforms
the regular Taylor rule, we apply the RMSE- and the MAE-criterion. RMSE estimates
the root-mean-squared-error and gives a measure of the diﬀerences between values. We
compare the RMSE of our Taylor rule constructed with shadow rate and the standard
Taylor rule, to the federal funds rate of our “out-of-sample”-period. The series that returns
the lowest RMSE is the one that has the highest precision of estimating the funds rate.
The mean absolute error (MAE) measures the average of the absolute diﬀerences between
our estimated and the realized values. The reason for including this measure in addition
to RMSE is that the RMSE squares the residuals, hereby penalizing large errors more.
Thus, which is the preferred method depends on the relative weight one wish to place
on larger errors. To gain a more comprehensive insight into the diﬀerence between our
estimations we include both measures in the analysis section.
5.3.2 Overidentification
To determine whether our estimations provides valid results, we must test for
overidentification (Guay et al., 2004). This is done by the use of Hansen’s J-statistic,
where we test the null hypothesis that the values for our parameter vector [⇢,↵,  ,  ] exist.
Not rejecting the null hypothesis implies that the residual is orthogonal to the variables in
the information set. On the other hand, rejecting the null implies that the orthogonality
condition is violated, and we have omitted relevant explanatory variables. Rejection of
the null can additionally imply that our model is misspecified, as the J-test function as
an overall test for misspecification. In section 6 we include the results from the J-test inn
our GMM-estimations.
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5.3.3 Stationarity
Our method of estimating Taylor rules using GMM relies on the assumption that all
variables are stationary. This implies that the statistical properties (e.g. mean, variance
and autocorrelation) are all constant over time. A stationary time series does not contain a
unit root. Thus, we test for stationarity in our regressors using the augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) test,
 Yt = ↵ +  Yt 1 +
PX
p=1
 p Yt p + ✏t
in which ↵ is a constant. Our null hypothesis is that | | = 0, i.e., meaning that the time
series is not stationary, while our alternative hypothesis is that | | 6= 0, meaning that the
time series Yt converges to a stationary time series. The results from our ADF-test are
presented in section 6.1.2 and appendix A4.1.
5.3.4 Robustness
To ensure robustness in our estimations we use diﬀerent gap measurements, as well as
using data samples from diﬀerent time periods. This is done to ensure that we have robust
estimates that are representative for a larger scope than the initially applied data and
timeframe.
When using GMM to estimate our models we set the weight updating to N-step iterative.
Contrary to 1-step iteration, the N-step re-estimates the covariance matrix until it
obtains converging estimates. This process gives diﬀerent weightings to diﬀerent moment
conditions. The observations with higher variance get a lower weighting, while the lower
variance observations get a higher weighting. The covariance matrix gets reiterated as
many times as needed until it obtains a numerical convergence. This implies that the
estimations of  ˆ and ⌦ˆ have numerical converged. Thus, the converged estimates present
a more robust model with a more stable  -coeﬃcient. We include a 1-step iteration
estimation for robustness in section 6.2.1.
Further options chosen for our GMM-estimations include HAC (newey-west), which
is applied to overcome autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, as well as applying the
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Marquardt optimization algorithm, which minimizes the sum of the weighted residuals in
a non-linear regression.
5.3.5 Misspecification
There is no clear literary consensus regarding the validity of a smoothing parameter in
the policy reaction function. Rudebusch (2002) argues that there is misspecification in
the model proposed by (Clarida et al., 1998). The argument is that the coeﬃcient does
not reflect smoothing, but rather other factors that cause a deviation from the policy
rule. The findings from Rudebusch has gained literary support, see for instance English
et al. (2003) and Gerlach-Kristen (2004). They find that adding more regressors in the
model leads to a drop in the smoothing parameter. However, they do not support that
there are no monetary policy inertia. Hence, they argue that the estimations of large
smoothing coeﬃcients reflects an over-cautiousness in central banks, which they believe
to be inaccurate, but they still argue the validity of the smoothing coeﬃcient. (Carare
and Tchaidze, 2005)
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6 Analysis
To estimate our Taylor rules we use the preferred Taylor rule presented by Clarida et al.
(1998). There appears to be a literary consensus about the validity of their Taylor
rule, see for example Orphanides (2007) and Ascari and Ropele (2009). In their paper
they argue that the forward-looking Taylor rule gives the most precise estimations. To
determine whether inclusion of shadow rate data yields a more precise model we will
use the RMSE and MAE-criterion, testing out-of-sample performance, in addition to a
graphical comparison. For robustness we also present an estimation where we use 1-step
iteration, a forward-looking model using employment gap instead of output gap and
estimations conducted with diﬀerent time horizons.
6.1 Forward-looking Taylor rule
Initially, we fit the forward-looking Taylor rule, presented in section 3.2.3. As we use a
smoothing parameter, we are dealing with a non-linear estimation. Hence, we use the
General Method of Moments (GMM) in EViews10. See section 5.2 for a description of
GMM. The model assumes that the Federal reserve uses four quarters ahead expected
inflation and output gap when determining the federal funds rate, substantiated by
research from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2019). The variables used are inflation,
output gap, a smoothing parameter and a constant, all of which are presented in section
4. As our model is based on the best fitting model from Clarida et al. (1998), we apply
the same instruments as presented in their paper. This implies four lags of the regressors
as well as commodity inflation and long-short spread, both presented in section 4.1.5.
Including our constant, we have a total of 21 instruments. The estimated models span
from 1987Q2 until 2015Q4. Since we use four lagged terms as instrumental variables the
adjusted sample starts at 1988Q2. Clarida et al. referred to the model as their baseline
model, for readability purposes we use the same name. The estimated Taylor rule model -
previously presented as equation 3.8 - is as follows:
it = (1  ⇢)(↵ +  E[⇡t,k] +  [xt]) + ⇢it 1 + ✏t
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Our goal is to measure how the estimations diﬀer when we include data for shadow rate in
place of the federal funds rate during the ZLB-period. Firstly, we present the coeﬃcients
resulting from the GMM estimations. The results are displayed in table 6.1 below.
Table 6.1: Baseline model
Baseline
(1) (2)
Standard SR
⇢ 0,80*** 0,87***
(0,03) (0,02)
↵ -0,88 -0,67
(0,55) (1,00)
  2,29*** 2,20***
(0,20) (0,39)
  0,93*** 1,28***
(0,10) (0,16)
N 111 111
J-stat 13,88 13,27
P-value 0,68 0,72
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Estimated model: i t = (1  ⇢ )(↵ +   E[⇡t,k] +   [xt]) + ⇢it 1 + ✏t.
Model (1) includes four lags of the eﬀective federal funds rate, while model (2) includes four lags of the
eﬀective federal funds rate and shadow rate for the period it persisted. Both models include four lags of
inflation, output gap, commodity inflation(PPIACO) and the spread between the 10-year Treasury note
and the 3-month Treasury bill(T10Y3M) as instrumental variables.
As opposed to the original Taylor rule presented in section 3.1, the output displays larger
coeﬃcients for inflation and output gap. This is reasonable as we introduce the smoothing
parameter. Most of the coeﬃcients are highly significant, except for the constant terms.
The meaning of this coeﬃcient is presented in section 3.2. The p-value for the Hansen
j-statistic is 0.68, see section 5.3.2. To approximate a true information set and reach a
model where all coeﬃcients are significant, we introduce more instrumental variables (see
section 4.1.5). When including more instrumental variables we must be thoughtful in
that the instruments should correlate with the regressors but not with the error term.
Following existing literature, see for example Siklos et al. (2004) and Skumsnes (2013),
we decide to include data for US house price inflation, return on average equity, total
public debt, unemployment gap and the exchange rate between US dollars and British
pounds to represent the information of the financial markets (i.e. approximate the true
information set). See section 4.1.5 and appendix A1 for more insight into our chosen
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instruments. By adding these we have a total of 41 instrumental variables. The result
is that all coeﬃcients are significant at a five percent level. Furthermore, the resulting
p-value from the J-statistic is 0.98, implying that we reject the null of overidentification.
The results achieved from adding the additional instruments are shown in Table 6.2 below,
compared to the results from the baseline model.
Table 6.2: Baseline and extended model
Baseline Extended
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard SR Standard SR
⇢ 0.80*** 0.87*** 0.80*** 0.86***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
↵ -0.88 -0.67 -1.11*** -1.60***
(0.55) (1.00) (0.35) (0.52)
  2.29*** 2.20*** 2.37*** 2.58***
(0.20) (0.39) (0.12) (0.18)
  0.93*** 1.28*** 0.90*** 1.24***
(0,10) (0,16) (0,06) (0,08)
N 111 111 111 111
J-stat 13,88 13,27 17,79 18,77
P-value 0,68 0,72 1,00 0,99
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Estimated model: i t = (1  ⇢)(↵ +   E[⇡t,k] +   [xt]) + ⇢it 1 + ✏t.
Model (1) and (3) includes four lags of the eﬀective federal funds rate, while model (2) and (4) includes
four lags of the eﬀective federal funds rate and shadow rate for the period it persisted. All the models
include inflation, output gap, commodity inflation(PPIACO) and the spread between the 10-year
Treasury note and the 3-month Treasury bill(T10Y3M) as instrumental variables. Model (3) and (4) also
includes change in housing prices(CSUSHPINSA), return on average equity for all U.S banks(USROE),
total public debt(GFDEBTN) and also, the US/UK exchange rate(DEXUSUK).
Model (4), i.e. the extended model including shadow rate, will be our leading model
throughout the thesis. Next, we discuss the coeﬃcients and the economic intuition behind
their values. A prominent diﬀerence between our two secondary estimations is noticed
when viewing the coeﬃcients relating to the smoothing parameters. The coeﬃcients are
relatively large, which could imply that the Federal Reserve reacts slowly with monetary
policy when there are changes in inflation and output gap. However, we cannot deduce
anything about the short-term diﬀerence by looking at the smoothing parameters isolated,
because the real eﬀect is determined by combining coeﬃcients. To compare the implied
one-period reaction to changes in inflation and output gap we view the coeﬃcients less
the value deducted from the smoothing parameter. Thus, (1–⇢)⇤⇡ equals the one period
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response to a one percent change in inflation.
(1  0.80) ⇤ 2.37 = 0.47 (6.1)
(1  0.86) ⇤ 2.58 = 0.36 (6.2)
From equations 6.1 and 6.2 we can see that the estimated response to a one percent
change in inflation at time t is a 0.47% in the eﬀective federal funds rate for the regular
estimation and 0.36% from the estimation with shadow rate. Implying that the inclusion
of shadow rate yields a less responsive policy towards inflation targeting. Following the
logic from inflation, (1–⇢)⇤  equals the response to a one percent change in output gap.
(1  0.80) ⇤ 0.90 = 0.18 (6.3)
(1  0.86) ⇤ 1.24 = 0.17 (6.4)
From the estimated responses to output gap changes, equations 6.3 and 6.4 we see that we
get similar results from the two estimations, 0.18% versus 0.17%. Thus, there are negligible
deviations in how the estimations react to changes in output gap at time t. Furthermore,
we see that the constant from both estimations are negative. The term is defined as ↵ =
(i* – 2⇤ ), see section 3.2. Substituting our coeﬃcients, we get i*=3.63 for our regular
estimation, and i*=3.57 for the shadow rate estimation. The long run real equilibrium
rates are therefore 1.63 and 1.57, respectively. Compared to values obtained from similar
research in the existing literature we can see that the results appear reasonable (Clarida
et al., 2000). Our estimated smoothing coeﬃcient (see model (4) in table 6.2) coincides
with existing literature (e.g. Bullard et al. (2018) and Kliesen (2019)), who assigns the
parameter ⇢ a value of 0.85. To further compare our two estimates, we initially show
them graphically, while also displaying the eﬀective federal funds rate.
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Figure 6.1: Extended model
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As we can see from the graphs the estimations yield similar results. However, the estimation
that accounts for the shadow rate appears to be a better fit. To confirm which estimate is
the most precise we apply the RMSE and MAE criteria, presented in section 5.3.4. The
resulting outputs are presented in the following table.
Table 6.3: RMSE and MAE results
Standard SR
RMSE 0.299 0.197
MAE 0.274 0.165
From the measures we see that the Taylor rule estimated with shadow rate is a better
fit for the federal funds rate, substantiating our graphical findings. The output from the
estimation with shadow rate shows 0.197 and 0.165 for RMSE and MAE, respectively.
From the regular estimation without shadow rate we get results of 0.299 and 0.274,
respectively. However, the two estimations display similar properties, both graphically
and by the diﬀerence between the RMSE- and MAE-measures.
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6.1.1 Weak instruments test with OLS
In our model with the extended information set, the choice of instrumental variables is
largely based on comparable literature and trial and error, to reach a significant model.
Thus, the degree of relevance of the instruments is uncertain. Weak instruments implies
that they are weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors. In this case, GMM
estimations can perform poorly in finite samples. Following literature from Bun and
Windmeijer (2010), we see that, in the case of weak instruments, the GMM estimations is
biased in the direction of the OLS estimations. Therefore, to assess the strength of our
instruments we compare the results from our extended estimations to OLS estimation. It
is worth noticing that the OLS estimation suﬀers from endogeneity (i.e. violation of the
zero conditional mean for the error term), and its inclusion is solely to help in determining
whether we are suﬀering from weak instruments. The parameters are displayed in table
6.4 below.
Table 6.4: Extended and OLS model
Extended OLS
(3) (4) (5) (6)
Standard SR Standard SR
⇢ 0.80*** 0.86*** 0.82*** 0.87***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
↵ -1.11*** -1.60*** -0.99 -1.28
(0.35) (0.52) (0.61) (0.92)
  2.37*** 2.58*** 2.19*** 2.31***
(0.12) (0.18) (0.22) (0.34)
  0.90*** 1.24*** 0.81*** 1.07***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.19)
N 111 111 111 111
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Estimated models: i t = (1  ⇢)(↵ +   E[⇡t,k] +   [xt]) + ⇢it 1 + ✏t.
Model (3) and (4) is estimated using GMM, applying the extended information set.
Model (5) and (6) is estimated using OLS.
From comparing the related parameters (i.e. model (3) with (5), and model (4) with
(6)) we see that there is no evident equality between the parameters. Thus, it appears
that we can reject that we have biased GMM estimations with irrelevant instruments.
Additionally, Bun and Windmeijer (2010) presents further tests that can be more precise
in quantifying a potential relative bias. However, this is defined to be beyond the scope of
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our thesis.
6.1.2 ADF-test
As mentioned in section 5.3.3, stationarity is critical for robust and valid results. In
appendix table A4.1 the values of the test are presented. We have checked the main
variables of our model, being the federal funds rate with and without the inclusion of
shadow rate, inflation, the output gap and the unemployment gap. The output gap is
included as it will be used as a regressor for robustness check in the forthcoming section.
In the ADF-test we have added lags to ensure that autocorrelation is not creating biased
standard errors, where we have chosen four lags due to our four quarter perspective on
inflation.
We can reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity on our output gap and unemployment
gap variable. The variables also show robustness at diﬀerent lags with both being significant
at the 5% level on the first to fourth lag. The test shows that the inflation variable and
the variable for eﬀective federal funds rate with and without shadow rate is non-stationary.
However, using economic intuition, we believe that the interest rate and inflation is
stationary in the long run, as it will converge towards the long-term equilibrium interest
rate and inflation target, respectively.
6.2 Robustness
The results presented in the previous section relies on assumptions presented throughout
our thesis. This implies validity in the use of GMM, the chosen data and the time horizon,
see sections 4 and 5.2. To confirm that our results are representative in answering our
research question we therefore have to conduct robustness checks. Firstly, we challenge
the use of GMM by performing a 1-step iteration estimation. Then, we do estimations
where we replace the output gap data with data for unemployment gap. Lastly, we change
the time horizon and do additional estimations with adjusted samples. If the results from
our robustness checks coincide with the presented results (section 6.1), we can assume
robustness.
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6.2.1 1-step iteration
For an initial robustness check we include the results from a 1-step iteration. Contrary to
the n-step iteration this option gives one estimation of  ˆ and ⌦ˆ. It does not converge, thus
providing less good finite sample properties, see section 5.3.4 for a more comprehensive
description. When comparing the results of the diﬀerent weighting options we see that
the estimations yields comparable results, with minor deviations in the coeﬃcients. The
coeﬃcients are presented in appendix A4.2. To see whether changing the updating of the
weighting matrix yields diﬀerent results we display the models graphically.
Figure 6.2: 1-step iteration model
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As we can see from the graphs, the results are highly comparable to our previous findings
when we allowed the coeﬃcients to be re-estimated to numerical convergence. The model
that includes the shadow rate fits closest to the federal funds rate on our out-of-sample
data.
6.2.2 Model with unemployment gap
For robustness purposes we include estimations from a Taylor rule using unemployment
gap instead of the output gap data. This data is used by the Federal reserve bank
of Atlanta, and existing literature, see for example Taylor (1999) and Orphanides and
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Williams (2007), argues its value in interest rate setting. We include this estimation to
ensure that our results are valid to diﬀerent gap measures. We apply the same estimation
method and use the same instrumental variables as with our extended model. The results
from the GMM estimation are presented in Table 6.5 below, compared to the results from
our extended model.
Table 6.5: Extended and UEG
Extended UEG1
(3) (4) (7) (8)
Standard SR Standard SR
⇢ 0.80*** 0.86*** 0.85*** 0.87***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
↵ -1.11*** -1.60*** -1.33* -1.11
(0.35) (0.52) (0.73) (0.72)
  2.37*** 2.58*** 2.26*** 2.15***
(0.12) (0.18) (0.23) (0.26)
  0.90*** 1.24*** 0.44*** 0.68***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
N 111 111 111 111
J-stat 17.79 18.77 18.23 19.90
P-value 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99
1UEG = Unemployment gap
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Estimated model: i t = (1  ⇢)(↵ +   E[⇡t,k] +   [xt]) + ⇢it 1 + ✏t. For model (3) and (4) x = output
gap, while x = unemployment gap as a regressor in model (7) and (8).
Model (3) and (7) includes four lags of the eﬀective federal funds rate, while model (4) and (8) includes
four lags of the eﬀective federal funds rate and shadow rate for the period it persisted. All models include
four lags of inflation, output gap, commodity inflation(PPIACO), the spread between the 10-year
Treasury note and the 3-month Treasury bill(T10Y3M), change in housing prices(CSUSHPINSA), return
on average equity for all U.S banks(USROE), total public debt(GFDEBTN) and also, the US/UK
exchange rate(DEXUSUK)
Firstly, we see that both estimations have a P-value for the J-statistic of about 0.99.
Except for the constant, all coeﬃcients are significantly diﬀerent from zero at a 1-percent
level. The constant is significant at the 10-percent level for the standard estimation, while
the constant from the estimation with shadow rate is almost significant with a p-value of
0.1276. To compare the models to the out-of-sample eﬀective federal funds rate we view
them graphically.
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Figure 6.3: Robustness: unemployment gap
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From the visualization there is no clear indication on which estimation is the better fit.
Due to the graphical similarities we include accuracy metrics to determine which yields
the best out-of-sample performance.
Table 6.6: RMSE and MAE results: unemployment gap
Standard SR
RMSE 0.204 0.191
MAE 0.168 0.155
From the accuracy metrics we see that the estimation conducted by including shadow rate
yields a slightly better fit. It seems that changing the gap measure leads to inconclusive
results regarding which model is the most precise. This poses an interesting point regarding
the choice of gap measures by the central bank. If the Federal Reserve uses unemployment
gap as their measure, our findings suggests that including shadow rate yields minor
out-of-sample performance improvements. On the contrary, it is worth noticing that the
parameters displays higher standard errors, and neither ↵-parameters are significant at
the five percent level. Hence, the out-of-sample comparisons yields less conclusive findings
than our previous finding using output gap. Furthermore, from our accuracy metrics we
see that the estimation using shadow rate yields a better out-of-sample fit. This implies
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that the results are comparable to the estimation from section 6.1.
6.2.3 Models with diﬀerent horizons
6.2.3.1 ZLB sub-period
In section 2.4 we claimed that research has focused on the pre ZLB-period to summarize
the eﬀects of monetary policy. This implies that we should view the findings from our
extended model compared to a pre ZLB-estimation. Thus, we estimate an adjusted sample
ending in 2008Q4, i.e. at the start of the zero lower bound. For robustness, we present
the resulting output graphically, compared to our extended model with shadow rate.
Figure 6.4: Robustness: ZLB sub-period
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From the figure we see that our extended model yields a more precise estimation. Thus,
we can confirm that our findings are robust to analyses excluding the ZLB-period. The
related parameters are presented in appendix A4.3.
6.2.3.2 Adjusted data samples
When deciding the period to start our estimation we used the structural break following
the policies of the newly elected chairman of the federal reserve in 1987. Judd et al. (1998)
and Hamalainen et al. (2004) estimates policy rules for diﬀerent sample periods. They
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argue that ↵ and   may be sensitive to the current policy regime. They find that the
Federal Reserve has reacted diﬀerently over time to inflation and output gap. To ensure
that our results are robust to diﬀerent time horizons we adjust the start and end point of
our estimation sample. We use the recession indicators from the federal funds rate data
to set starting points for robustness estimates, indicating alternative structural breaks.
From the data we view recessions ending in 1991Q2 and 2001Q4. Thus, we use these as
starting points for our adjusted samples. Furthermore, we wish to include an estimation
that accounts for more data surpassing the ZLB-period. Hence, we include an estimation
where we set the end of the sample to 2016Q4, one year later than our original estimation.
The results from the GMM estimations is presented in table 6.7 below.
Table 6.7: Adjusted samples
(1991Q2-2015Q4) (2001Q4-2015Q4) (1988Q2-2016Q4)
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Standard SR Standard SR Standard SR
⇢ 0.83*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.91*** 0.81*** 0.86***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
↵ -1.51*** -1.62* -1.53*** 3.43*** -1.26*** -1.50***
(0.44) (0.67) (0.51) (0.92) (0.36) (0.56)
  2.48*** 2.57*** 2.18*** 0.12 2.41*** 2.55***
(0.18) (0.26) (0.23) (0.43) (0.12) (0.20)
  0.88*** 1.27*** 0.68*** 1.66*** 0.91*** 1.24***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.05) 0.09) (0.06) (0.08))
N 99 99 57 57 115 115
J-stat 19.23 20.85 13.48 14.32 18.57 18.77
P-value 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Estimated model: i t = (1  ⇢)(↵ +   E[⇡t,k] +   [xt]) + ⇢it 1 + ✏t.
Model (9), (11) and (13) includes four lags of the eﬀective federal funds rate, while model (10), (12) and
(14) includes four lags of the eﬀective federal funds rate and shadow rate for the period it persisted. All
models include four lags of the eﬀective federal funds rate, inflation, output gap, commodity
inflation(PPIACO) and the spread between the 10-year Treasury note and the 3-month Treasury
bill(T10Y3M), change in housing prices(CSUSHPINSA), return on average equity for all U.S
banks(USROE), total public debt(GFDEBTN) and also, the US/UK exchange rate(DEXUSUK) as
instrumental variables.
All estimations appear to be valid and the coeﬃcients are of reasonable values. All
coeﬃcients are significant except for the one relating to inflation from the estimation
starting in 2001Q4. To determine whether our results are robust to changes in the sample
horizon we display the estimations graphically. The graphs are displayed below.
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Figure 6.5: Robustness: adjusted sample 1991Q2 - 2015Q4
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Figure 6.6: Robustness: adjusted sample 2001Q2 - 2015Q4
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Figure 6.7: Robustness: adjusted sample 1988Q2 - 2016Q4
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From the graphical visualizations we can see that in two of the three estimations, including
the shadow rate results in more precise estimations. In our adjusted sample starting
in 2001Q2 we see that the regular estimation fits better. However, as we saw in table
6.7, the  -coeﬃcient is insignificantly diﬀerent from zero. Additionally, the estimation
is conducted using only 57 observations, which could imply ambiguous results. Thus, it
is diﬃcult to draw conclusions from the deviations between those two estimations. The
accuracy metrics for the adjusted samples are presented in appendix A4.4, A4.5 and A4.6.
Generally, our results implies that the findings in section 6.1 are representative for a
broader spectrum of sample horizons than initially presented.
6.3 Limitations
Before presenting our concluding remarks it is beneficial to include critique and possible
limitations to our research. Our findings is based on assumptions regarding the shadow
rate, and its validity in describing the stance of monetary policy, presented in sections 2.4
and 4.1.2. This implies that our conclusions will be limited by the eﬃcacy of the shadow
rate. The fact that the employed shadow rate is estimated, and not observed like the
eﬀective federal funds rate, poses a potential limitation regarding the correctness of the
6.3 Limitations 43
rate and presented standard errors. Our estimations are based on the assumption that the
estimated shadow rate are highly comparable to the observed federal funds rate, which is
questionable. Hence, more research on the eﬃcacy of the shadow rate by Wu and Xia
would imply more reliable results.
The estimations conducted using GMM relies on valid and relevant instruments. Our
choice of instrumental variables in the extended information set is based on comparable
literature and a process of trial and error. Furthermore, our model validity is largely
based on the tests of the orthogonality restrictions. However, literature suggests that we
could be suﬀering from weak, but many instruments, see section 6.1.1. We test our results
against an OLS estimation, but further quantitative testing may be necessary to confirm
strong instruments. Thus, our instruments may be weakly correlated with the endogenous
variables, i.e. low instrument relevance. This would impose challenges to inference from
our GMM estimations.
Next, our robustness check using unemployment gap yielded inconclusive results. Further
research may be necessary to conclude whether employing shadow rate in a Taylor rule
with unemployment gap is beneficial. There are also critiques to the general validity of
Taylor rule estimations on monetary policy (e.g. Siklos and Wohar (2006)). But, due to
the scope of our thesis, we do not view this as limitations to our findings.
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7 Conclusion
In this thesis we have estimated Taylor rules using diﬀerent datasets to determine whether
the inclusion of shadow rate for federal funds data improves the estimations. We have
based our model selection on the work of Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1998, 2000). To ensure
robustness we changed the horizon of our estimation, included a 1-step iteration and
changed the gap parameter. Due to the structural break following the replacement of the
chairman of the federal reserve, we started our sample period in 1987Q2. We used the
period from 2016Q1-2019Q3 to test the accuracy of our estimations.
From the comparison of the baseline and extended models we saw that including shadow
rate yielded a lower eﬀective coeﬃcient for inflation, while the coeﬃcients for output
gap where fairly similar. This was also the case when we changed the model input for
robustness purposes. Most of the robustness checks implied validity in our extended
results, as they showed improvements from including the shadow rate. The estimation with
the shortest adjusted sample did not contribute to our extended results, but insignificance
in the parameter makes the estimation more negligible.
To determine which estimations that most accurately described the federal funds rate
we used the RMSE- and MAE-criterion. The results were that the estimation conducted
using shadow rate gave the most accurate results. However, the two estimation pairs
displayed similar properties, as one would expect considering the majority of the data is
the same, meaning that the results were somewhat inconclusive. The resulting coeﬃcients
were significant, and we could reject the J-test for overidentifying restrictions for both
estimations. In addition, the conducted ADF-test showed that both our inflation and
federal funds rate data was non-stationary. However, we believe that both these measures
converge towards their long-term equilibrium targets.
Furthermore, our results contributes to the findings of Wu and Xia (2016), who advocated
the value of the shadow rate in long-term macroeconomic models. Our analyses suggests
that shadow rate can be used as a tool to view monetary policy in a Taylor rule setting,
using data with the presence of a ZLB-period.
Our goal was to figure out whether there was valuable information in including the implied
interest rate during the ZLB when estimating the Taylor rule. By this standard, we can
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conclude that there is value in inclusion of the shadow rate.
As mentioned in section 3.1, Taylor stated that the policy rule should not be followed
mechanically, but rather function as an indicator. With this in mind, the findings in
this thesis suggests that including shadow rate data could bring a more comprehensive
indication of monetary policy.
The findings from this thesis validates the usefullness of shadow rate in Taylor rule
estimation. Few models have incorporated shadow rate in macroeconomic analyses.
Including shadow rate to account for monetary policy during a ZLB-period in further
macroeconomic models are left for future research.
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A1 Data appendix
FEDFUNDS - Quarterly averages of daily figures of the eﬀective federal funds rate. The
data is provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Shadow rate - Quarterly averages of monthly figures of the shadow rate calculated by
Wu and Xia (2016). The data is provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
Expected inflation - For expected inflation the forecasted value of four-quarter PCE
inflation three quarters ahead is used. It is a measure of the PCE inflation of the current
quarter together with the median forecast of the subsequent three quarters. It is provided
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters.
(GDPC1) & (GDPPOT) - The output gap measured as the percentage diﬀerence
between potential gross domestic product and real gross domestic product. Potential
GDP is an estimate of the output the economy would produce with a high rate of use of
its capital and labor resources, adjusted for inflation. Real GDP is the inflation adjusted
value of the goods and services produced by labor and property located in the United
States. The data for real GDP and potential GDP is provided by the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis and the U.S. Congressional Budget Oﬃce, respectively.
PPIACO - Commodity price inflation measured as average change over time in the
selling prices received by domestic producers of goods and services. The sample goods
and services included in the index is weighted by their size and importance. The U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the index.
CSUSHPINSA - The SP/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices is an quarterly average of
monthly data on the value of single-family housing within the United States. Given a
constant level of quality, the indices measure percentage changes in housing market prices.
A2 Shadow rate estimation 51
T10Y3M - Quarterly averages of daily figures of the spread between 10-Year Treasury
Constant Maturity and 3-Month Treasury Constant Maturity. The primary data is
obtained from the U.S. Treasury Department.
USROE - Quarterly frequency of the change in ratio between net income and average
of total equity capital of all US banks. This constitutes the return on average equity.
The raw data is collected by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council and
structured by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
GFDEBTN - Quarterly(end of period) frequency of change in totalt public debt for the
U.S. The data is collected by U.S. Department of the Treasury.
DEXUSUK - The US/UK foreign exchange rate displays the change in number of U.S
dollars for one British Pound. The data exhibits the quarterly average of daily figures,
and is provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
A2 Shadow rate estimation
Following the research by Wu and Xia (2016) we derive the shadow rate. They initially
assume that the short term interest rate is the maximum of the shadow rate st and a
lower bound r:
rt = max(r, st) (A.1)
Next, they assume that the shadow rate is an aﬃne function of some state variables Xt,
st =  0 +  
0
1Xt (A.2)
which follows a first order vector autoregressive process:
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Xt+1 = µ+ ⇢Xt + ⌃"t+1, ✏t+1 s N(0, I) (A.3)
Following existing literature they view the log stochastic discount factor as aﬃne
Mt+1 = exp
✓
 rt   1
2
 0t t    0t"t+1
◆
(A.4)
where the price of risk  t being linear in the factors
 t =  0 +  1Xt
Implying the risk neutral measure Q dynamics for the factors are also first order vector
autoregressive:
Xt+1 = µ
Q + ⇢QXt + ⌃"
Q
t+1, "
Q
t+1
Qs N(0, I) (A.5)
The parameters are related as follows:
µ  µQ = ⌃ 0,
⇢  ⇢Q = ⌃ 1.
Lastly, they propose an analytical approximation for the forward rate in the SRTSM.
Followingly, they define fn,n+1,t as the forward rate at time t for a loan starting at t+ n
maturing at t+ n+ 1,
fn,n+1,t = (n+ 1)yn+1,t   nynt (A.6)
Final approximation is shown as equation 4.1 in section 4.1.2. Lastly, they use the
extended Kalman filter, as the observation equation is non-linear in the factors. The filter
linearize the non-linear function g(.) around the current estimates. See Wu and Xia (2016)
for more details.
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A3 Figures
Figure A3.1: Baseline model
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A4 Tables
Table A4.1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test on regressors
Lags (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) Constant
FEDFUNDS -0.77 -2.03 -2.09 -2.14 -1.94 Yes
Shadow rate -0.75 -1.89 -2.17 -2.08 -1.84 Yes
Expected inflation -2.52 -2.32 -1.85 -1.71 -1.77 Yes
Output gap -1.33 -1.77* -2.07** -2.03** -1.97** No
Unemployment gap -0.8519 -2.07** -2.43** -2.41** -2.07** No
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Value of test statistics are presented in the table.
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Table A4.2: Extended and 1-step
Extended 1-step
(3) (4) (15) (16)
Standard SR Standard SR
⇢ 0.80*** 0.86*** 0.80*** 0.86***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
↵ -1.11*** -1.60*** -1.27** -1.78*
(0.35) (0.52) (0.58) (0.91)
  2.37*** 2.58*** 2.39*** 2.61***
(0.12) (0.18) (0.21) (0.33)
  0.90*** 1.24*** 0.85*** 1.22***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.18)
N 111 111 111 111
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Estimated model: i t = (1  ⇢)(↵ +   E[⇡t,k] +   [xt]) + ⇢it 1 + ✏t.
Model (3) and (15) includes four lags of the eﬀective federal funds rate, while model (4) and
(16) includes four lags of the eﬀective federal funds rate and shadow rate for the period it
persisted. All the models include inflation, output gap, commodity inflation(PPIACO) and the
spread between the 10-year Treasury note and the 3-month Treasury bill(T10Y3M) as
instrumental variables. Model (3) and (4) also includes change in housing
prices(CSUSHPINSA), return on average equity for all U.S banks(USROE), total public
debt(GFDEBTN) and also, the US/UK exchange rate(DEXUSUK).
Table A4.3: Extended model and Pre-ZLB period
Extended (SR) Pre-ZLB period
(4) (17)
⇢ 0.86*** 0.73***
(0.02) (0.01)
↵ -1.60*** -1.47***
(0.52) (0.15)
  2.58*** 2.54***
(0.18) (0.04)
  1.24*** 1.07***
(0.08) (0.03)
N 111 83
J-stat 18.77 19.70
P-value 0.99 0.99
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Estimated model: i t = (1  ⇢)(↵ +   E[⇡t,k] +   [xt]) + ⇢it 1 + ✏t.
Models are estimated using GMM, applying the extended information set.
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Table A4.4: RMSE and MAE results: 1991Q2-2015Q4
Standard SR
RMSE 0.237 0.171
MAE 0.217 0.143
Table A4.5: RMSE and MAE results: 2001Q4-2015Q4
Standard SR
RMSE 0.112 0.160
MAE 0.090 0.118
Table A4.6: RMSE and MAE results: 1988Q2-2016Q4
Standard SR
RMSE 0.299 0.231
MAE 0.285 0.204
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